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1.  EPISTEMOLOGICAL DOUBTS 
 
There are a few things I do not understand about which I might keep asking 
silly questions for a life-time: first, what a no-truth theory of literature means; 
second, that God exists within some language games; third, that truth is the 
agreement of specialists on a given topic, that is of symposiasts 1 after a good din-
ner; fourth, I cannot understand, in the field of theory, the value of the nowa-
days swamping pragmatism, whose procedures can at best ratify only that which 
is already existent 2. There are four things I do not understand in the world, and 
                                                                
1 A viable definition of this new species of the genus Homo Sapiens might be the 
following: silly enthusiastic assertive post-something, politically correct ethically spurious, 
usually English-speaking specialists on a subject (tendentially ignorant of all the rest) used 
to participate to presumably cultural refundable meetings throughout the world. 
2 For a no-truth theory of literature, see Lamarque and Olsen (1994:1-25). They ar-
gue, for instance, as follows (4): Although our own view rejects any essential link between 
truth and literature we do not hesitate to acknowledge a large number of non-essential, or 
contingent, links. It thus seems that they are, strangely enough, adopting an essentialist 
metaphysics in order to develop a pragmatic epistemology of literature. This demonstrates 
how difficult it is in practice to do away with traditional notions such as essence, reference, 
truth, etc. The language-game theory of truth-and-belief is of course one of Wittegnsteins 
celebrated legacies to the twentieth century mind; it has been cheerfully adopted by many 
self-indulgent, weak-thinking, consolatory hermeneutics. For the consensus-theory of 
truth, see Rorty (1980), especially the last three chapters. Habermas (1985), chapter XI. 
The overwhelming dominion of pragmatism in Western thought runs back at least to 
Kants promotion of practical pure reason to the role of leader over the self-limiting un-
derstanding (Critik der practischen Vernuft, 1788). See Rorty 1982, Introduction and chap-
ter IX, especially.  
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were I to understand all the rest I would still feel unhappy, and keep on putting 
trivial questions 3. 
Whenever I face dangerous questions of theory, I always keep importun-
ing myself on whether we can really dispense with such old fashioned Platonic 
notions as beauty, goodness, value, essence, and, naturally, truth. Of course we 
all know that truth may have different meanings, according to the fields of 
enquiry and the social/linguistic contexts in which we use this word: truth may 
either be the correspondence of propositions with facts, or the internal coher-
ence of a text, or the sudden revelation of a thing or an idea, etc. Poetic truth, in 
particular, is the composition of at least all the three above mentioned senses of 
truth, which of course include beauty as their corollary. Stephen Dedalus in 
Joyces A Portrait of the Artist (1960:211), using Aquinas words in a non-
scholastic way, called them integritas, consonantia and claritas (wholeness, propor-
tion and splendour). 
In talking of the truth of poetry (rather than of literature at large, which is a 
much wider field) the first question that comes to my mind is whether there is still 
something worthy left to be said. If so, then the second question should regard 
the kind of relationship we wish to explore: say, between appearance and reality, 
or fact and fiction, or life experience and literary representation. Or what else? All 
these questions, however, entail some nexus between essence and appearance 4. 
We need this just in order to think, as we need the sense/reference relationship in 
order to communicate and speak. In any case, we need a root difference, of some 
kind, in order to perceive and to represent the world. Be it difference in time: be-
fore and after; in space: here and there; or difference between time and space. 
Having difference of some kind, we can also project a continuum. Therefore the 
first problem of language (both of art and science) is: what sort of difference be-
comes prominent in a certain period and in a given field of discourse? In order to 
explore any object of enquiry, we first need to isolate this object against its back-
ground, and secondly to suspend the flux of time so as to keep the object steady 
                                                                
3 This paper was originally read at a Literature and Cognition seminar, during the 
IV ESSE Symposium, held in Helsinki (25-29 August 2000). 
4 Most non-essentialist, post-modernist, theories of literature and culture of roughly the 
last thirty years seem to me mere fashionable chatter, useful at most to the publish-or-perish cul-
tural industry of American Institutions. See Sokal (1997), for a few amusing examples of prepos-
terous scientific blunders by some French maîtres à penser, especially cherished by American 
men/women of letters ; such is, for instance, Lacans suggestive equation of the symbolic phallus 
with the imaginary number corresponding to the square root of -1 (32) ; or Irigarys bewildering 
assertion that Einsteins formula for the exchanges of matter and energy (E=Mc2) is a sexed equa-
tion (104). For those who are interested, in Sokals book there are quite a few other amusing 
specimens of our recent light-hearted epistemology of human sciences. 
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in view and to trace a network of relationships within it. Focusing and time suspension 
belong to the act of perception as such. The experience of space implies as such 
the time rhythm of existence. Thus, when we intentionally suspend our judgement 
on a given event (exercising our critical faculties), when we create or perceive a 
work of art, or when we make love to somebody (all widely different experiences 
to be sure), we do not perhaps enact incomparable performances. 
I rather suspect that there have always been at least two cultures 5 in the 
Western tradition, the scientific and the humanistic, because we possess at 
least two separate powerful brands of symbolism: numbers and letters; in the 
former, a quantitative difference stands out, in the latter a qualitative one. But 
it is only a question of prevalence. Consider for instance the four Kantian 
categories of the intellect: quantity, quality, relation and mode (Kant 1772: 
Book I). All of them work both in linguistic and in mathematical operations. 
The question is which is prevalent in a given social context: the dominant (the 
all-powerful) difference does in fact de-form the fields of action and percep-
tion in history (Mateika and Pomorska 1971:66-90). 
As regards the relative value of poetry and science, the burden of proof 
(usually belonging to the useless fine arts) might well be reversed nowadays, 
when the quantitative, statistical, informational side of meaning is becoming 
overpowering in social life. Now that science and technique create a plethora 
of parallel worlds (cybernetic or biologic copies and versions of things), 
which are accepted as everyday matter of fact, do these global-market perva-
sive fictions still preserve the heuristic (cognitive, affective, moral) function of 
poetic fictions? In our thoroughly pragmatic civilization, is there still a place 
left for effective critical fictions? The time honoured problem raised by the 
defences of poetry throughout the ages might well now be reformulated as no 
longer that of the truth-value of fiction, but rather that of the fiction-value of 
reality.  
 
 
 
2.   PHENOMENOLOGY OF LITERATURE 
 
Whenever I discuss the forms of literature, I always keep in mind the basic 
difference I have touched upon before: it is at once an ontological and a se-
miotic one. Phenomena, appearance, doxa; all the metamorphoses of reality 
                                                                
5 I am of course referring to the well-known debate between F.R. Leavis and C.P. 
Snow in the 1960s. 
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and myth, and our experience thereon, stem from our assumption of a differ-
ence between appearance and being (let us still call it an ontological differ-
ence); it is the precondition of the logical difference between sense and refer-
ence in linguistic utterances. At any point of our lives, we presume that there 
is a possible difference in the issues of our actions, in order to know, to com-
municate, to have pleasure or pain. Now I wish to pose the following ques-
tion: are the cognitive, the communicative and the erotic experiences mutually 
comparable? And if they are, what sorts of analogies hold among them? My 
hypothesis runs as follows: an aesthetic experience is constituted by a con-
tinuous circuit of objects of passion, communication, and knowledge (pathe-
mata, semeia and noemata). In some sense, pathos comes first: we suffer the per-
ception of things; only secondly do we trace the relations between parts and 
whole of the perceived object: this is an operation of semiotic and communi-
cative order; lastly, we operate a synthesis, identifying the individual object as 
such, unifying the multiple sensations and relations, the perceptual variety. 
The individual object of cognition is always a type, a Platonic idea: there is no 
concrete object in experience but only multiple sensations. The one as such is 
ideal, it is a scheme, a type, a pattern. Nevertheless it is real. Otherwise how 
could we speak of different phenomena, or tokens, or experiences, or versions 
of a given world? 6 
But we ought not, in any case, to reach out too swiftly towards the one real 
(extrapolated) being and then back to the manifold experience, in order not to 
miss the circumstantial truth of the voyage and not to impair the pleasure of grad-
ual discovery. We should instead suspend the plotting of time, the chrono-logical 
operations of before and after, cause and effect, and keep our time for a while in 
order to give some sense to our life experiences: What will the spider do /, Sus-
pend its operations, will the weevil / Delay?  asks the little old man in Eliots 
Gerontion (Eliot 1969:37-9). We are in fact endlessly drawn backwards by the 
senseless whirlwind of change into the nightmarish webs of history, like the angel 
in Paul Klees picture. We are the spider (now plotting the world-wide telematic 
web) and the prey, and the Angel too. After the Fall (there is always a fall trigger-
ing a story), we have long felt lost in the nightmare of history. But History may 
be servitude, History may be freedom 7, like memory and time. Time may be un-
expectedly redeemed when it becomes a pattern of endless moments, in the 
                                                                
6 Cf. the long-running debate, in Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy, between Good-
mans irrealism and Putnams internal realism. See Goodman 1978; Putnam 1992. Both 
positions are well exemplified in McCormick (1996:61-77, 179-200). 
7 This and the following quotations are from Eliots Four Quartets. See Eliot 
1969:171-98. 
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ongoing narrative of our minds. Both in individual and historical consciousness, 
plot (the reconstruction of the past) is rendered through speech figures 8, but 
these figures can appear only in the mimesis of plotted action in time: Only 
through time time is conquered. Eliots paradoxes of time, memory and history 
owe much to the Neoplatonic tradition, through Augustine, Bergson, Bradley etc. 
But his periphrastic way of putting the question of meaning and tradition, his 
rhetoric of time and history is also notably indebted to Einsteins idea of the uni-
verse. One may already perceive this debt at the beginning of the Four Quartets: 
Time present and time past / Are both perhaps present in time future; and, 
reading on through the Four Quartets, one gets further evidence of this, as with the 
following lines: The detail of the pattern is movement, / As in the figure of the 
ten stairs, lines that remind us of the influential implied observer of relativity and 
quantum theory. Modernist dominant representations of time and history have 
certainly something in common with early twentieth century physics and maths. 
What they share is at least a common rhetoric, beyond the differences of numbers 
and letters. Any period of history has in fact a basic rhetoric, unifying philoso-
phy, science and poetry. Rhetoric is the discipline of the transfer of figures of 
thought in different languages. It is the discipline (both in a cognitive and moral 
sense) of translation and of tradition, of the handing over of knowledge, in differ-
ent conceptual areas and experiential predicaments. 
The epochal character of a text or of a theory, both in science and poetry, lies 
in the dominant rhetorical strategies there employed: in the use of certain distinctive 
oppositions; in the choice of some privileged themes, topoi and schemes of language 
and behaviour. Rhetoric may be the common tool for the understanding of the rela-
tions of science and poetry, provided that in our conception of rhetoric we some-
how change the emphasis from the act of disposition to that of invention; and pro-
vided that we also keep in mind that a rhetorical figure is a linguistic type and a his-
torical trace of sundry complex existential attitudes. What I call existential rhetoric 
may be the common ground of science and literature. 
Lets take for instance the very concept of change in time: metamorphosis. 
Literally: change of form. But form can be conceived as versus either its back-
ground, or content or function. According to which contrast we privilege, we shall 
get a different concept of metamorphosis, different scientific agendas and different 
                                                                
8 This has convincingly been demonstrated by Haydin White in his several works. 
See, for instance, White 1978: chapter IV. White is not responsible for the blatant igno-
rance and perverse arguments of some of his neo-historicist, trifle-hunting and/or revi-
sionist followers. In one of his most recent works (1999: chapter V), and with particular 
reference to Auerbachs idea of western literary history, White brilliantly argues for figural 
causation as being the distinctive principle of modernist historicism. 
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poetics. In Newtons universe, for example, the equations of movement are devel-
oped on the basic opposition between physical mass and distance; in Einsteins uni-
verse, instead, they are constructed on the difference between energy and matter. 
However, we need two terms and their connection, from which issue those ideal 
objects capable of organising our manifold experience. Geometrical objects are of a 
similar kind. For instance, Euclids geometry gives us descriptions of ideal objects 
(or actions), according to the three dimensions of space. Descartess geometry, in-
stead, provides us with object descriptions based on the ratio between space and 
time coordinates: we might say that the former is prevalently structural, while the lat-
ter is functional. Yet science and poetry always speak the language of their time, 
there is a core of figures shared by them: there is an epochal rhetoric common to 
them. 
 
 
 
3.   GEOMETRICAL AND POETIC ARTEFACTS 
  
I here suggest looking at poems and narratives as complex geometrical o-
bjects. Have you ever noticed that some mathematical and some rhetorical fi-
gures bear the same name: circle, parable ellipsis, hyperbole? The conics: spi-
rals of time-space, in Yeatss A Vision. Rhetorical figures are rather similar in 
function to simple geometrical objects. They are a schematic outline, a discur-
sive simplification of experience. I can think of nothing better than geometry 
and rhetoric together when I am faced with Kants mysterious schematism of 
the intellect (Kant 1778: Book II), which should allow us to make sense of the 
world of experience. Conceiving poems as ideal objects of perception, in ana-
logy with geometrical objects, might be a first step towards the development 
of a phenomenology of literature that is not reduced to linguistic hermeneu-
tics. 
There are a few more questions issuing from the analogy between poems 
and mathematical objects. The latter in fact allow us to pose and often solve 
problems through the application of repeatable procedures (or algorhythms). 
But recursive rhetorical procedures (schemata) are also the means of poetry 
making, and the principle of repetition-with-variation (parallelism) is the es-
sence of poetry. Problems are therefore reasonable candidates for comparison 
with poems. Problem-making and poiein have in fact some features in com-
mon. They are both interrogations, attempts to make sense of the world of 
experience. Where they diverge is that a poem does not admit of solutions 
while a problem does. But if they differ in their demonstrative power, they are 
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quite similar in their heuristic function; or in what we may call the phase of 
rhetorical invention. I dare go a step further in this direction: an oracle, a 
riddle is a sort of middle term between a poem and a problem. It has a poem 
structure and yet it allows of (at least partial) solutions.  
Here are some of the questions implied by my analogy between poems 
and problems: is there an aesthetic and/or an erotic pleasure in problem sol-
ving? Is there a mathematical side of aesthetic experience? Does an equation 
imply a sender, a receiver, and a hero in action? Has an algebraic expression a 
story and a character? If not, why are melodies (which, as algebraic expres-
sions, entail algorithms) sometimes said to have an ethos? Is there any diffe-
rence in kind or in degree between discovering a logical truth, creating a beau-
tiful form, and laying bare a human body (male or female)? If knowledge im-
plies a kind of pleasure, pleasure is basically erotic, eroticism is essentially tran-
sgressive, and the taboo of incest is the threshold between nature and culture, 
being at the core of all cultural covenants, (Levi-Strauss 1947: chap. I); then, is 
the oedipal triangle intrinsic to problem solving? In this case, is it the riddle of 
the Sphinx that brings about the tragedy of Oedipus, or rather is it his ince-
stuous drive that helps the hero in the riddle solution? Are the riddle and the 
problem-solving eventually unrelated with the tragic (poetic) pathei mathos 
(knowledge through suffering) and with the mythic drive towards metem-
psychosis, or reincarnation with loss of memory, which is after all the arche-
type of all poetic experience? 
Here, for instance, are three quite telling riddles from the School episode 
(chap. II) of Joyces Ulysses. There Stephen Dedalus is giving and receiving an 
evangelical lesson (the opposite of catechism, which is the theme of this epi-
sode) through several disciplines: history, poetry, and maths. The first riddle is 
theological: To Caesar what is Caesars, to God what is Gods: Dedalus 
broods upon it. The second is historical: The cock crew / The sky was blue: 
/ The bells in heaven / Were striking eleven. / Tis time for this poor soul / 
To go to heaven: the riddle elliptically refers to the passion and death of 
Christ. The possible incarnation of the poetic and prophetic Word of love, 
through and beyond the received Scriptural Law, is in fact the main topic of 
the episode (Martella 1997:154-69), while the focus of this lesson given by 
Stephen to the spoiled rich young Dubliners shifts from history (Pyrrhus) to 
poetry (Miltons Lycidas), to maths (Sargents problem-solving). The third rid-
dle is a mathematical problem: Stephen helps a dull ungifted pupil to solve it. 
After this Samaritan-like act, all the substance of the Ancient Law (or the Old 
Testament), and the grammars of different languages are vivified and unified, 
in Stephens mind, in the following wonderful picture of quintessential mime-
sis:  
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across the page the symbols moved in grave morrice, in the mummery of 
their letters, wearing quaint caps of squares and cubes. Give hands, traverse, 
bow to partner: so: imps of the fancy of the Moors. Gone too from the world, 
Averroes and Moses Maimonides, dark men in mien and movement, flashing 
in their mocking mirrors the obscure soul of the world, a darkness shining in 
brightness which brightness could not comprehend. (Joyce 1971:34)  
 
A pantomime of symbols of sundry nature. An act of love towards our 
neighbour has finally resolved the theological, the historical and the mathema-
tical problems into one poetic representation. The suffering Word of love 
made flesh can give us a reliable unified living picture of the world, for the 
time being. This is the basic pattern of the whole Christian-platonic symbo-
lism in Ulysses.  
 
 
 
4.   KINDS OF SYMBOLISM 
 
In all kinds of symbolism we can distinguish the prevalence of one of the fol-
lowing functions: prescription, description, or inscription. The first, for instance, is 
characteristic of Biblical texts: a barely sketched plot-plus-character charged 
with thick moral background (Auerbach 1968: chap. I). The second is to be 
found in the Homeric (and in the standard fictional) texts, containing the rep-
resentation of events on the foreground, only with secondary didactic implica-
tions; the third, you can best find both in maths and in lyric poetry: that is dis-
courses growing on themselves, aiming at the generation of objects from 
within, apparently regardless of any external reference. And in music too, 
which nevertheless, through the sense of hearing, arouses feelings and pas-
sions from the elaboration of mathematical ratios. 
On the synchronic plane, the above distinction obtains: every language 
can either prescribe behaviours with regard to a world; or describe features of 
this world; or inscribe new elements in the world. As regards time, instead, 
language can recall things to memory, communicate a present experience, or 
anticipate events of the future. These logical and temporal dimensions of lan-
guage, of course, obtain also in the case of its fictional uses. 
On the logic plane, a language can be assertive (thetic and antithetic), inter-
rogative, or hypothetical. To assertions, questions and hypotheses, in mathematics 
correspond respectively demonstrations,  problems and theorems. Between 
question and assertion, there is the hypothesis; which amounts to saying that 
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the answers to questions imply, or use, hypotheses, in the same way as the so-
lution of problems employ theorems. I have already suggested that, in a heu-
ristic perspective, poetry may be compared with problem-making. My idea is 
now that, from a rhetorical point of view, a poem is analogous to a theorem, 
in the sense that it is a construct of ratios and figures, constituting a usable 
hypothesis for the positing and/or solving of problems. Obviously, in the case 
of a poem, the issues at stake are not of a purely intellectual but rather of an 
existential order, and the rhetorical figures constituting them have performa-
tive and affective, more than informative, character. 
We all know that language is a complex tool: it can privilege connections 
with either social norms, or natural worlds, or its own technique. It can 
prevalently be oriented towards what must be, what is, or what can be. That is, 
it may prevalently be normative, mimetic, or inventive. The creative language par ex-
cellence is that of mathematics, because it seems not to have to comply with any 
sensorial bonds. Mathematical creativity is only indirectly and holistically con-
ditioned by the human body. Precisely because it is not directly linked to any 
human experience or to any aspect of the world, maths is generally the most 
reliable and effective of disciplines. 
Mathematical language schematises and articulates the perceptual and 
operative relations between man and his world, in its objectivity and totality. 
Therefore, its propositions are usable and effective at any unforeseen time for 
the solution of historically contingent problems. Poetic language, while be-
ing originally referential, conative and affective, when turning upon itself, imi-
tating mathematical self-referentiality, becomes as viable as the other one for 
the occasional positing or solving of existential problems. At the point at 
which it becomes autonomous, poetic language does not eschew its mimetic 
function, but on the contrary allows on principle the global, integral and realis-
tic (impersonal and disinterested) representation of mans predicament. 
We might assume at this stage that between Saussures structural and Jakob-
sons functional linguistics there is a difference similar to that (which I have previ-
ously pointed out) between descriptive classical geometry and analytical Cartesian 
geometry. Let us now quickly recall Jakobsons typology of the main linguistic 
functions. As is well known, it implies six basic factors of linguistic communica-
tion: sender, context, message, contact, code, and receiver. According to the pre-
vailing orientation of the utterance towards one of these factors, Jakobson distin-
guishes six corresponding functions of language: emotive, referential, poetic (or self-
referential), phatic (contact), metalinguistic, and conative. He rightly remarks that 
the difference of messages is not based on the monopoly of any of these func-
tions, but rather on the shifting hierarchy among them, and that the verbal struc-
ture of a message depends above all on the dominating function. Language can 
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accordingly be studied through the difference of its functions, and the poetic 
function for the place it has among the others. 
In this classification, no reference is made to mathematical language, but 
the argument can be easily extended to it. Mathematical language seems exclu-
sively oriented on the message and on the code, that is on the poetic and 
metalinguistic functions, which are apparently mutually antithetical, the former be-
ing eminently generative, the latter definitory. Maths fuses in a unique process the 
poetic and the metalinguistic functions of ordinary language. Meanwhile, the other 
functions are not erased but only temporarily suspended or put within brackets. 
References to the sender, the receiver, the world, and the channel of communica-
tion are momentarily neutralised but still subsist in mathematical operations. Thus 
the reference of the mathematical utterance to its environment is virtual, objective, 
and holistic.  
Poetic language, on the other hand, not differing in this from mathematical 
language, constructs its utterances through a process of selection and combination 
of symbols. When Jakobson gives us his famous definition of poetry - the poetic 
function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection to that of 
combination. The equivalence is promoted to the degree of constitutive element 
of the sequence (Jakobson 1960:356) - he is but noticing, in the field of poetry, a 
movement of ordinary language towards the ideal autonomy and creativity of 
mathematical language.  
Mathematical language is the most poetic and the least emotive language we 
have. The emotive and the constructive functions of language seem indeed to be 
antithetical: the impersonal theory of art held by such authors as Flaubert, James, 
Eliot, Joyce etc., does in fact only recognise this state of affairs. But human ex-
periences are also always emotionally coloured. Poetry must then strike a delicate 
balance between the expression of emotions and the mimesis of events, between 
subject and object, between token and type. Its basic patterns are the rhetorical 
figures, provided they be conceived as discursive types of existential attitudes (dis-
positio) as well as instruments for the invention of new worlds (inventio).  
When recoiling upon itself, poetic language is indeed not escaping the 
world of experience, but rather defending itself from the intrusive power of 
emotions and feelings, and drawing for the subject of experience a temporary 
area of freedom from the tyranny of passion and action, in order that he can 
beget some knowledge form his pleasure and pain. Similarly, mathematical 
language has on principle set itself free from the world of experience and 
from its constraints only in order to be, on occasions, the tool of some new 
and more effective description of that world. 
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